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Abstract 
Introduction: Disaster management can face to emergency situation without any 
pre-sign and even if it has forecast they can meet the requirements of improvisation 
making their decision. Improvisation can be taken at any level of the management 
(strategic, operational and tactical) but at tactical level the time press is certainly the 
biggest problem. This article focuses on tactical level and shows some method to 
compensate time press. Method: Author studied relevant literatures and used own 
experience as a firefighting manager. Other studies made by the author previously 
were also used. Results: Without time press disaster managers can use analytical 
thinking but in case of time press they must prefer critical thinking, satisfactory pro-
cedures or management by exceptions but creativity and heuristics are also used in 
their decision. Author created a complex model of decision making in emergency: 
building on practical experience the above mechanisms together with the internal 
triggers hold as pillars the recognition-primed decisions on which locate the princip-
als of disaster management. 
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1. Introduction 
An important element of the activities of emergency responders is that they cannot or 
only to a very limited extent can modify the terms of the task, improve them as desired. 
Despite the differences of environment, indications of the complexity of the situation, 
the possibility of the radical change in the given situation, uncertainty and ambiguity of 
the information available can be recognized and well identified. Most of these factors 
are present; occasionally all of them may be present at a certain level of emergency de-
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cisions: including the strategic, operational and tactical levels, but certainly with a dif-
ferent focus or at different times. On strategic and operational level, in general, not only 
more time is available, but also human and technical resources are at hand more 
broadly, and decision support instruments as well to reduce uncertainties occurring. All 
of them stand implicit at the background of the intervention’s safety, which is priority 
during the intervention and also very important and complex question at tactical level 
[1] [2].  
The different scopes of tasks exist in different environments and structures, so the 
solution of similar basic problem also exists in other dimensions. Based on author’s 
own experience, the more extensive case we are dealing with in time, the more the 
above factors cumulatively prevail, but because of the protracted implementation, it is, 
however, easier to solve them. The most limiting factor from the above is time, proven 
by essays and presentations firefighters made and author investigated. This provides a 
framework impossible to burst and a forced drift, a pressurized channel for the deci-
sion-maker, entangled in which one can no longer break free. The functional back-
ground of decisions made in a short time, their mechanism different from the conven-
tional was studied in latest time, and gave the name recognition-primed decision to this 
special decision procedure.  
2. Mechanisms Complementing a Recognition-Primed Decision  
Different triggers, internal resources ensure the operation of recognition-primed deci-
sions. Klein, in his work, assumes 5 markedly distinct abilities, these are intuition, im-
agination, perception of the invisible, the ability to formulate, metaphors and analogies 
[3]. In the joint work of Cohen, Freeman and Thomson [4], draws the attention to the 
importance and benefits of critical thinking as criticism of actions planned by ourselves.  
Despite the fact that one could assume, that recognition-primed decision-making 
enjoys exclusivity on a tactical level, it is absolutely not true. We can compare it with 
several disasters or incidents, still, one of the essential features is that it protracts in 
time. It allows the decision-maker to think over the situation, collect information, de-
velop action versions and consider. Floods or forest fires develop for several days or 
hours and covering a large area. During protracted decision-making, the recognition- 
primed processes, based on author’s experience, proved to be irreplaceable assistance 
rather in solving partial tasks.  
2.1. Analytical Thinking  
Killion sees the combination of recognition-primed decision-making with the analyzing 
and evaluating procedure in two ways [5]. In both cases, the conditions are that ade-
quate time should be available for analyzing the options. In the first case, prior to rec-
ognition-primed decisions, focusing on the given circumstances, we set up options and 
analyze them. In the second case, a more detailed analysis of the action version of our 
recognition-primed decision may take place. In the latter case, the spectrum of the task 
is obviously significantly narrower than in the first case. The two mechanisms, de-
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pending on the situation, can be harmonized or one of them may become predominant.  
The observation of the elemental parts of multi-aspect decision-making shows that 
decision-makers divide complex problems to smaller and smaller partial problems until 
they become such a basic level problem that a decision-maker is able to solve even with 
little effort [6]. This latter process can also be a recognition-primed decision-making, 
but logically we can find Duggan’s view [7], according to which successful decision- 
makers not perceive a problem until they can solve it.  
2.2. Critical Thinking on a Tactical Level  
Cohen, Freeman and Wolf studied the possible decision support role of critical think-
ing on a tactical decision-making level [4]. In their work, active naval officers and case 
reports were studied based on which they state that experienced emergency deci-
sion-makers, in new situations, using their previous experience, make decisions with 
help of recognition-primed mechanisms. Cohen’s model explains in detail the critical 
analytical strategies that contribute to the operation of recognition-primed thinking. 
Systematic situation models often based on informal narratives as schemes organize our 
information in cause and effect relationship in individual cases and underpin the de-
velopment of recognition-primed thinking.  
One of the most important elements of Cohen’s model is the quick test. A quick test 
is a higher-level control mechanism for critical analysis and its accuracy. Its recognition 
strategies are formed, similarly to other decision-making processes, by the success or 
failure experience of past events. The complex recognition mechanism comes to the 
fore when the demand on time and resources for critical analysis is overweighed. It is 
possible in three well-definable cases [4]. A quick test considers the conditions in the 
light of the above factors, and if appropriate, prevents recognition-primed decision, and 
focuses on critical thinking. When circumstances are not adequate, a quick test will al-
low for an instant reply.  
2.3. Satisfactory Procedure Mechanism  
We have seen previously that an emergency manager’s time to make a decision is li-
mited. Since this time limit precludes the possibility to carry out the necessary analyses 
of the classic model, objectively the choice of an optimum option is not achievable for a 
decision-maker. In response to the difficulties of the collection of information and the 
reduction of the costs in relation, a decision-maker does not strive for optimum results, 
but, depending on the circumstances, settles for satisfactory solutions.  
The above process, different from analytical thinking, is enforced by several factors. 
Some of these factors are the impossibility of obtaining all information necessary to se-
lect the best solution, or the shortage of time; the latter induces a compulsion of deci-
sion-making. The limited nature of the processing information available is also of sig-
nificant influence. Filtering the information, and by this the selection of response to the 
tasks is necessary because the capacity of our short-term memory is quite limited. Ac-
cording to Miller’s studies, it allows the parallel processing of only 7 ± 2 bits of infor-
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mation at one time [8]. If emergency manager made all the basic decisions, his deci-
sion-making capacity would be immediately exhausted at a complex task.  
Despite the small capacity, thanks to recognition-primed mechanisms, correct deci-
sion is made in most cases. An emergency manager, using his experience, in situations 
not requiring decisions different from the previous solutions, implement automatic 
measures, protocol procedures, thus continuously maintains his decision-making ca-
pacity. In this case, using his own experience, an emergency manager is not interested 
in the series of best elementary decisions used to eliminate the problem, but only in sa-
tisfying the conditions of professional work through the decisions made as a whole.  
2.4. Decisions by Exceptions  
The aim of the application of the method is that the leadership responsibilities of man-
agers should be drastically reducible; its essence is that we should only intervene into 
processes having permanent characteristics in majority, if they cross the pre-specified 
lower and upper limits. The method, management by sensitive exception, so derived 
from the dynamics of the processes, the necessary interventions are now possible even 
before crossing the borders [9]. The method of management by exceptions, based on 
author’s experience, is the greatest help for a firefighting manager to continuously 
maintain his decision capacity. It can appear in different ways, like protocol procedures, 
individual way of speaking, silence approval, peripheral vision, and information- 
processing in zones.  
The experience and competence of the persons performing a given activity allows every 
firefighter to make his basic decisions in his own field of work. This shows the ar-
rangement in zones of information processing (Figure 1). Of course, not every incident 
or moment requires response. This zone does not require action that is practically ig-
nored by a firefighter, because it is a natural consequence of extinguishing. A significant 
part of problems outside the zone, as a result of a firefighter’s decision in that location,  
 
 
Figure 1. Decisions based on exceptions in firefighting view. Source: Author. 
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is solved by intervention (firefighting), this information now reaches the firefighting 
manager, but he usually does not require a decision yet. A firefighting manager manag-
es the problems outside this zone that exceed the decision-making competence of sub-
ordinate firefighters. This originates in the fact that, on the one hand, based on the in-
formation from reconnaissance and radio traffic, he can create a comprehensive and 
dynamic picture of the entire process, the evolvement of fire or the efficiency of extin-
guishing, on the other hand, legislation entitles firefighting managers to take actions.  
2.5. Creativity  
Creativity has many definitions. Munteanu, in one of his works, presents 35, which ap-
proach creativity, in different ways, however, there is no single definition generally ac-
cepted or used, either [10]. Analyses researching creativity show that there are three 
general directions of study [11]. The first concerns the nature of creative thinking, the 
second one the development of creativity and the third one the characterizing proper-
ties of creative people. Amongst the properties, there is practically none, which would 
not be advantageous for efficient work in a special environment describing the working 
conditions of managing disasters. Based on the above the creative capabilities of an 
emergency manager can be explicitly beneficial for facilitating the technically correct 
decisions relating to managing emergency situations.  
Creativity can significantly increase professional efficiency of decisions made by 
emergency managers in unexpected situations. This can be seen when first aid medical 
service, special rescue teams or firefighters are able to turn local conditions, in a mo-
ment, into exploitable advantages. However, author found that a significant part of 
properties characterizing innovativeness do not prefer everyday work, free of interven-
tions, in structured organizations, in respect of firefighting managers. This is confirmed 
by research findings as well, according to which it is explicitly problematic to follow 
strict rules for people producing creative results (The Reader's Digest Association Ltd., 
1992).  
2.6. Heuristics  
Heuristics means that certain distortions are not incidental and unarranged errors, but 
the results of simplifying mechanisms, with which decision-makers make the compli-
cated tasks manageable for themselves, which cut the Gordian knot [12]. Based on re-
searches related to the names Tversky and Kahneman, we distinguish 5 basic groups of 
heuristics [13]. These are representativeness, availability, fixing (imprint) and adjust-
ment heuristics, retrospective distortion, as well as overconfidence and calibration. 
Studying the activities of firefighting managers, there are many examples of practical 
heuristics.  
Overconfidence, based on author’s judgement, is one of the greatest risk factors of 
the efficiency of decisions of an emergency manager. They, quite often, stops searching 
for the information necessary earlier than sufficient, based on his experience, he trusts 
his own judgement, many times, assuming unnecessary risks. The extent of rational risk 
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assumed during interventions should be always chosen proportionately to the given 
task.  
Researches show that overconfidence means that the division between actual and 
putative knowledge is around 50% [14]. We are best able to judge the certainty of our 
decisions around 80% of knowledge, over this value, we underestimate our abilities. 
The above have shown that our actual knowledge does not grow parallel with certainty; 
the increase of our knowledge does not automatically mean the growth of self-assur- 
ance [12]. During intervention the characteristic of the given environment exactly ex-
presses that the actual knowledge of a decision-maker can only be partial, he can only 
be sure temporarily of the reliability of his knowledge. Aggregating the above, we can 
see that the risk of overconfidence continuously prevails in the decisions of an emer-
gency manager.  
3. Summarizing and Modelling of Decision-Making in Emergency 
If not enough time is available for analyzing and evaluating decision-making, recogni-
tion-primed procedures receive a greater role. Critical thinking uses recognition pro-
cedures, during which the decision-making process can be accelerated or analyzed with 
the help of a quick test and depending on the time available. The quick test, considering 
the circumstances, hinders recognition-primed decision and prefers critical thinking. 
However, when the circumstances are inappropriate for critical analyzing thinking, the 
quick test allows immediate reply.  
Despite the limited decision capacity, thanks to recognition-primed mechanisms, in 
most of the occasions, correct decisions are made by emergency managers. Time limit 
precludes the possibility for the manager to carry out analyses necessary for the classic 
model; therefore, the selection of the optimal possibility is objectively not attainable by 
the decision-maker. The decision-maker is not striving to achieve ideal results, as a re-
sponse to the difficulties of collecting information and reducing costs in relation, but 
depending on the circumstances, he is satisfied with its satisfactory solution.  
By reducing the time available for decision-making and for maintaining decision- 
making capacity, an emergency manager applies the management (decision-making) 
method based on exceptions in numerous situations. Its essence is that several mo-
ments of interventions proceed protocol-like, thus, they need not be controlled all the 
time; on the other hand, not all the phases of the processes require direct management 
decision.  
During the study of creativity, author has concluded that there is no feature charac-
teristic of the working circumstances of emergency managers that would not be advan-
tageous to perform efficient work in a special environment. Therefore, it is sure that the 
creative capabilities of emergency managers can be explicitly advantageous to facilitate 
the professionally correct decisions on interventions even if a significant part of the 
characteristics of innovativeness does not favor the performance of an everyday work 
free of interventions.  
Heuristics are not random-like errors or specific distortions facilitating our everyday  
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Figure 2. Complex model of decision-making of disaster managers. Source: Author. 
 
activities. These are the results of simplifying mechanisms, through which decision- 
makers can make difficult tasks manageable for themselves. Besides the benefits of heu-
ristics, the greatest challenge for an emergency manager can mean the inherent erro-
neous distortions, which surely often help, but their uncritical acceptance, in certain 
cases, can end up in fatal dangers. The declared objective and sense of the decisions of 
emergency managers is the efficient implementation of interventions. It is symbolized 
by the principles of emergency management with structured division, on the top of 
which we clearly find the saving of human lives.  
Emergency managers certainly have less time to make their decisions compared to 
the time interval of classic decisions, so, their decision mechanism is strongly based on 
recognition procedures due to the peculiar environment, and the limited process possi-
bility of simultaneous pieces of information. The competence of emergency managers is 
based on the unity of theoretical knowledge and practical experience. Building on prac-
tical experience, the different mechanisms like analogical thinking, critical analysis, sa-
tisfactory procedure, decisions based on exceptions, creativity and heuristics, together 
with the internal triggers, hold as pillars and make recognition-primed decision proce-
dure of emergency managers operational. Author illustrates the above as a complex 
system of emergency decision-making of disaster managers in Figure 2.  
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